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Abstract
We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and
agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are
determined by the outside market. We show that the optimal compensation con-
tract optimizes the combination of implicit incentives from both career concerns
and ratchet eﬀects. In contrast to existing results, implicit and explicit incentives
might be complements, and the principal might want to give strongest explicit in-
centives for agents far from retirement to account for the fact that career concerns
might induce behavior in conflict with the principal’s preferences. Furthermore,
we show that maximized welfare might be decreasing in the strength of the ca-
reer concerns, and that optimal incentives might be both positively and negatively
correlated with various measures of uncertainty.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are
limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns - concerns about the eﬀects
of current performance on future compensation. An agent’s career concerns are assumed
determined by outside principals (or the market or the professional environment). As a
result, agents’ career concerns are determined by factors outside the principal’s control.
The following example illustrates the type of situations we have in mind. Consider
a physician’s choice between treating more patients or spending more time on fewer
patients within a fixed time-budget. While hospital management (the principal) might
have a preference for treating more patients (due to e.g. DRG financing or waiting lists),
the medical profession typically puts more weight on the quality of treatments. I.e. it
prefers physicians to spend more time on each patient. Since the medical profession has
some influence on employment decisions, physicians might allocate more time to each
patient than hospital management prefer (to increase her chances of getting promoted).
Two questions that naturally arise are. How can the management, by oﬀering agents
explicit incentive contracts, induce behavior consistent with its preferences, and what are
the implications for welfare? To analyze these questions we put forward two versions of a
dynamic multitask models with both explicit and implicit incentives. The first version is
a simple two-period model that mainly serves to introduce the issues. Implicit incentives
are related only to career concerns in that version. The second version is an extension of
the first to more than two periods, and implicit incentives are then seen to consist not
only of career concerns, but also of ratchet eﬀects (Weitzman, 1976).1 In both cases we
assume that commitment to long-term contracts is limited.
In the analysis we want to emphasize that career concerns are determined by factors
outside the principal’s control, and that the current principal has more information about
the agent than prospective principals do. We therefore assume that career concerns are
related to a signal which is not verifiable — and thus cannot be contracted upon — and
that the inside principal observes an additional information signal.2
The general conclusions we obtain are firstly that optimal explicit incentives can
be non-monotone or strongest earliest in agents’ careers. The latter result resembles
the fact often observed in government agencies where subordinates get paid overtime,
while more senior oﬃcers are paid a fixed salary. Secondly, we find that career concern
incentives might be harmful for welfare. Finally, we show that the presence of both
ratchet eﬀects and career eﬀects produce incentives that can be highly non-monotone
in observable measures of uncertainty. Consequently, we oﬀer a possible explanation for
the fact that empirical studies observe both a positive and negative correlation between
risk and incentives.3
1The ratchet eﬀect reflects the fact that future periods’ performance standards depend on todays
performance in a way such that better performance today implies a tougher standard tomorrow.
2Alternatively, the inside principal might learn the agent’s ability faster than outside principals do,
as in Waldman (1984) and Ricard i Costa (1988).
3Prendergast (2000a) gives an overview of the empirical literature on the tradeoﬀ of risk and incen-
tives. See also Prendergast (1999, 2000b).
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Some of our results are at variance with findings in the existing literature, for instance
that optimal explicit incentives are increasing over time (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992),
and that career concern incentives have no eﬀect on maximized welfare (Meyer and
Vickers, 1997). The key to understand the diﬀerence in the results is to note that
agents exert eﬀort only on one task in both Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Meyer
and Vickers (1997). Thus, explicit incentives and career concern incentives are in these
papers substitutes; higher career concerns reduce the required explicit incentives needed
to induce a certain eﬀort level. Since career concerns are strongest earliest in agents’
careers, the required explicit incentives needed to induce a certain eﬀort level are lower
for agents far from retirement.
The substitutability eﬀect is also the mechanism behind the welfare result in Meyer
and Vickers (1997): Stronger career concerns reduce the need for explicit incentives and
thus reduce the risk faced by (risk-averse) agents. Since maximized welfare is decreasing
in the risk imposed on agents, stronger career concerns cannot lower welfare. In our
model, however, explicit incentives and career concern incentives are complementary in
the sense that higher career concerns (on one task) imply higher explicit incentives on
the other task. Thus, stronger career concerns impose more risk on agents, and thus
may lower welfare.
Our result that optimal incentives are non-monotone in various measures of uncer-
tainty is also related to the fact that agents have multiple tasks. It is thus possible that
both ratchet and career eﬀects are present at the same time but working through diﬀer-
ent tasks. In other words, there might be a career eﬀect present on one task, while, at the
same time, ratchet eﬀects influence the agent’s eﬀort choice through another task. Since
optimal explicit incentives will balance the total eﬀect of implicit incentives, the relative
strengths of career and ratchet eﬀects then influence how strong explicit incentives will
be. Furthermore, the relative strength of ratchet and career eﬀects varies with measures
of uncertainty, such that optimal explicit incentives might vary non-monotonically with
these measures.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the two-period version
with career concerns and explicit incentives. In section 3 we present the extended version
in which implicit incentives consist not only of career concern incentives, but also of
ratchet eﬀects. Section 4 discusses the related literature. Finally, section 5 presents
some concluding remarks.
2. Career Concerns and Explicit Incentives
There is one agent, two tasks (y and q), and two periods. It is assumed that the
agent’s career concerns are determined by the outside market (or outside principals or
the professional environment). Career concerns are related to the q−signal. The agent’s
choices of eﬀort generate two information signals, yt, and qt. Outside principals observe
qt, which is not verifiable. There is competition among these in period 2, and they (the
market) oﬀer the agent a reward based on the signal observed the previous period; wO2 (q1).
The inside principal observes qt (not verifiable) and yt which is suﬃciently verifiable that
contracts can be written on it. By this we mean the following. The signal can be verified,
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but only at a cost, and the parties know that whoever breaks the contract will have to
pay the verification costs if the case is taken to court. Hence, no party will renege the
contract if the verification cost is suﬃciently high. The principal oﬀers the agent (linear)
payments wt = αt+βtyt.
4 We further assume that only one-period contracts are feasible.
The agent privately chooses (et, at), where et (at) is eﬀort supplied into the production
of yt (qt). The private cost (in monetary units) is C(et, at) = 12(et + at − z)2, et, at ≥ 0.
Thus, eﬀorts on the two tasks are perfect substitutes. Moreover, the cost function implies,
in line with Holmström and Milgrom (1991), that the agent’s ideal total eﬀort is some
positive level z > 0. The agent prefers to exert some eﬀort rather than being totally idle
at work.
Given the eﬀort choices the two signals are
yt = η + et + εt,
qt = η + at + ε
q
t ,
where η ∼ N(m0, σ2η), εt ∼ N(0,σ2y), εqt ∼ N(0,σ2q). We assume that all error terms are
independent of each other and of ability η.
The agent’s utility function is exponential, and there is no discounting:
u(x1, x2) = − exp{−r
2X
t=1
[wt − C(at, et)]},
where the coeﬃcient r ≥ 0measures the agent’s risk aversion. With linear compensation,
exponential utility, and normal random variables, the agent’s certainty equivalent is
CE =
2X
t=1
IE [wt − C(at, et)]− r
2
var(w1 + w2),
where IE is the expectation operator. Note that if the agent’s incentives on the two tasks
are not balanced, e.g. if there is a stronger (implicit) incentive on the q−task compared
to the y− task, then all eﬀort will be concentrated on the high-incentive task; we would
get et = 0 and at = β
i
t + z, where β
i
t is the incentive on the q−task.
All principals are risk-neutral and receive an expected gross benefit of B(et, at) where
B(., .) is concave. We assume that principals have a preference for the eﬀort being split
among the tasks, i.e. B(0, at) = B(et, 0) = −L, with L > 0 large. For simplicity we
assume B(et, at) = 12IE(yt + qt), for both et > 0, and at > 0. This formulation implies
that any principal will provide balanced incentives for the agent. Given such (positive)
balanced incentives the agent’s total eﬀort will exceed the ‘whistle as you work’ level
(at + et > z), and the agent will distribute this total eﬀort on the tasks in any way
the principal desires. Thus, balanced incentives are suﬃcient and necessary to avoid the
4The focus on linear contracts can be justified by appeal to a richer dynamic model in which linear
payments are optimal (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987).
4
‘disastrous’ outcome that either task is left idle.5 To simplify notation we renormalize
eﬀort such that z = 0 in what follows.
We further assume that, after an agent has worked for a principal, a special relation-
ship is formed between the two, e.g. due to the agent learning specific ways to perform
the tasks, resulting in an increased fixed benefit for this principal from keeping the agent
in his service. The additional benefit is suﬃciently large that the inside principal will
always want to retain the agent, even if unfavorable signals are observed in the first pe-
riod. This kind of assumption is in line with assumptions made in the existing literature
(e.g. Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Meyer and Vickers 1997).
In the second period the agent may leave and seek outside employment. We assume
that there is a (small) positive probability p > 0 that the agent must leave for exogenous
reasons, such as a move triggered by a job change for the agent’s spouse etc., and that
an outside principal cannot observe whether the agent leaves voluntarily or due to such
exogenous events. Competition among the outside principals will then ensure that the
agent is oﬀered a contract, wO2 (q1), that earns zero expected profits for such a principal.
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This will be an equilibrium because (a) the inside principal will in any case match this
oﬀer, hence (b) there is no reason for the agent to leave voluntarily (no self-selection),
and (c) an outside principal cannot therefore deduce anything helpful about the agent’s
type from her behavior on the job market.
Since (i) the tasks are perfect substitutes in the agent’s cost function, (ii) principals
have a preference for the eﬀort being split among both tasks, and (iii) qt is not verifiable,
the agent has no incentives to exert eﬀort (beyond the ‘whistle while you work’ level,
normalized to zero; z = 0) in the second period.7 As a result, outside principals oﬀer
the agent a fixed payment equal to the expected benefit (profit) generated by this eﬀort
level, i.e.:
wO2 (q1) =
1
2
IE((y2 + q2) | q1) = IEy2 + r0q(q1 − IEq1) =
σ2qm0 + σ
2
η(q1 − ba1)
σ2q + σ
2
η
.
where ba1 is their second-period conjecture about eﬀort a1 in period 1, and r0q = σ2ησ2η+σ2q .
The inside principal must oﬀer the same payment to retain the agent. The agent is thus
oﬀered a contract which is dependent on–in fact equal to–the conditional mean of his
ability given the observed first-period signal q1; i.e. wO2 (q1) = IE(η | q1). Note that the
agent receives this payment whether he stays with or leaves the inside principal in period
2.
5Our assumption is that a task left completely idle–or with only some minimal activity on it–
exposes the principal to a significant risk of a large loss. This can be avoided by maintaining the
minimal activity on the task. Balanced incentives guarantees that the minimal activity is maintained
on both tasks, and thus avoids the large expected loss. On the other hand, errors or mistakes may occur
on any active task—these are captured by the random variables in yt+qt—but the expected value of these
are positive.
6We assume that outside principals oﬀer relatively simple contracts and hence do not oﬀer screening
contracts.
7There are no career motives, since this is the last period, and hence all eﬀort would be concentrated
on the verifiable task if the inside principal provided incentives on that task. The inside principal prefers
a balanced eﬀort allocation, and hence does not provide such incentives.
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Since the second period compensation depends positively on the first period signal,
q1, the agent has incentives to exert eﬀort in the first period to increase his market
value. Again, (i)-(iii) apply and optimal explicit incentives must equal career concern
incentives, i.e. β∗1 = w
0
2(q1) =
σ2η
σ2q+σ
2
η
. Since β∗2 = 0 we have the following result.
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Proposition 1. Explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract are strongest
early in the agent’s career.
This result is at variance with the predictions from the theoretical model in Gibbons
and Murphy (1992), and is due to the fact that explicit and implicit incentives are
complementary in the sense that higher career concern incentives (on one task) imply
higher explicit incentives on the other task. Furthermore we note that this model–in
which implicit incentives are related only to career eﬀects–produces comparative statics
results in line with those of Holmström (1982); optimal incentives are monotonically
increasing (decreasing) in the ability variance, σ2η, (market noise, σ
2
q). These results are
to be contrasted with those in the extended version where both career eﬀects and ratchet
eﬀects are present–see Proposition 6-8.
The second result we get from this simple model is that welfare is non-monotone in
the strength of the career concerns, which varies with σ2η and σ
2
q. Specifically, career
concerns are increasing (decreasing) in σ2η (σ
2
q).
The total certainty equivalent for the agent and the principal is
TCE =
2X
t=1
·
1
2
IE(yt + qt)− C(et + at)
¸
− r
2
var(w1 + w2)
Recall that the agent’s second-period payment is independent of whether he stays with
or must leave the inside principal. In appendix A we show that var(w1+w2) = β
∗2
1 [4σ
2
η+
σ2q +σ
2
y]. Next, since β
∗
1 = C
0(e1+a1) = e1+a1, and
∂β∗1
∂σ2η
:= β∗01 =
σ2q
(σ2η+σ
2
q)
2 > 0, and since
moreover the production surplus (expected benefits minus eﬀort costs) in period 2 does
not depend on the variance σ2η, we get
∂TCE
∂σ2η
= β∗
0
1 β
∗
1
·
σ2q − σ2η
2σ2η
− r[6σ2η + σ2q + σ2y +
2(σ2η)
2
σ2q
]
¸
which may be positive or negative, depending on the parameters. To sum up.
Proposition 2. Expected welfare is non-monotone in the ability variance σ2η, and hence
in the strength of the agent’s career concerns. The more risk averse the agent is, the less
beneficial are stronger career concerns.
8Incentives are independent of risk aversion in this model; this stems from the invoked assumption
that eﬀorts are perfect substitutes for the agent. With less than perfect substitutes the principal could
provide positive incentives on the verifiable task in period 2 and yet maintain a minimal eﬀort level on
both tasks. Risk aversion would then matter for incentives. It appears that such a model would yield
similar results to those obtained in the simpler framework considered here.
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When career concerns are low, (e.g., due to a low σ2η), the gain of more eﬀort induced
by a stronger career concern outweighs its costs in terms of eﬀort costs plus risk costs.
When career concerns are strong, (e.g., because σ2η is high), optimal explicit incentives
are high. Thus, the agent bears much risk, and higher career concerns reduce welfare.
The result also holds true when agents are risk-neutral (r = 0). In this case total
welfare is decreasing in the strength of the career eﬀect when σ2η > σ
2
q . The intuition is
that when σ2η > σ
2
q, the career eﬀects are so strong that the agent’s cost of providing
more eﬀort outweights the associated increase in production value.9 We see that risk
costs add detrimental eﬀects to career concern incentives.
3. Career Concerns, Ratchet Eﬀects, and Explicit Incentives
We now analyze a three-period version of the model. In this setting implicit incentives
may include not only career concerns, but also ratchet eﬀects. Here we allow for the fact
that the agent’s working conditions may diﬀer across principals. For example, consider
two hospitals, one university hospital and one local hospital, and suppose the university
hospital is better equipped for research than the local hospital. The agent’s costs of
providing eﬀort for research relative to providing eﬀort for clinical work are then lower
in this hospital compared to the other. We represent this potential diﬀerence by two
diﬀerent agent cost functions, CO(et, at) = 12(γet + at)
2 and CI(et, at) = 12(et + at)
2,
γ > 0, for the outside and inside principals, respectively.
The assumption that the inside principal derives some extra benefits from the agent is
maintained, implying that this principal will in every period outbid the other principals
in equilibrium. In this section we further assume that the probability p of the event
that triggers a move by the agent is small. To simplify notation it will be ignored in the
following, but it should be kept in mind that all results are conditional on this probability
being suﬃciently small.10
3.1. Equilibrium Contracts
Outside and inside principals oﬀer in each period t = 1, 2, 3 contracts wOt = α
O
t + β
O
t yt,
and wt = αt + β
∗
t yt, respectively. The model is solved by backward induction, thus we
first consider the last period.
Period 3: The agent has no incentives to exert eﬀort since (i) the tasks are perfect
substitutes in the agent’s cost function, (ii) principals have a preference for the eﬀort
being split among both tasks, and (iii) qt is not verifiable. Moreover, there is competition
9Holmström (1982) contains a similar result.
10In what follows, all expressions for the agent’s and the inside principal’s surpluses are conditional
on the agent not being forced (by exogenous events) to quit the relationship, and thus should, strictly
speaking, be multiplied by the probability of exit not occurring. Additional terms capturing the surpluses
conditional on exit taking place should also be included, but these are insignificant for p small.
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among the outside principals. and therefore11
wO3 (q1, q2) = α
O
3 = IE(
1
2
(y3 + q3) | q1, q2) =
σ2qm0 + σ
2
η
P2
t=1(qt − bat)
σ2q + 2σ
2
η
,
where bat is outside principals’ conjecture about bat, t = 1, 2. The agent is thus oﬀered the
conditional expectation of his ability, given the observed signals q1, q2, and the market’s
conjectures about the prior eﬀort levels, ba1, ba2.
The inside principal conditions the contract she oﬀers the agent on all signals, y1, y2,
q1, q2, and will adjust the contract such that the agent’s third-period certainty equivalent
equals the market contract’s certainty equivalent. I.e. CEO3 (α
O
3 ) ≤ CEI3 = α3+β3IE(y3 |
y1, y2, q1, q2) − 12(e3 + a3)2 − r2var(wI3 | y1, y2, q1, q2). But, since, e3 = a3 = 0, and β∗3 =
var(wI3 | y1, y2, q1, q2) = 0, 12 we get α3 = αO3 . To sum up, both the inside principal and
outside principals oﬀer the agent the fixed payment α3 = αO3 .
Period 2: By using the fact that the agent has career incentives to exert eﬀort a2 in this
period, (to increase his market value), that the inside principal prefers balanced eﬀort,
and hence most provide balanced incentives, we have
β∗2 =
∂α3(q1, q2)
∂q2
=
σ2η
2σ2η + σ
2
q
.
Outside principals oﬀer a contract wO2 = α
O
2 + β
O
2 y2. To balance incentives on the two
tasks, the bonus oﬀered by an outside principal must satisfy βO2 = γβ
∗
2. This is so because
the marginal cost of the two activities satisfy ∂C
O
∂et
= γ(γet + at) = γ
∂CO
∂at
if the agent
works for an outside principal. Since there is competition between outside principals,
they earn zero expected profit.
The precise payment schemes for outside and inside principals in period 2 are de-
rived in appendix B. Here we are primarily interested in the implicit incentives that
these schemes give rise to, and in the following we give an intuitive derivation of these
incentives. We first show that the agent is exposed to implicit incentives on the y−task
in period 1, and that these are given by
βi1y = (γ − 1)β∗2R0y, where R0y =
∂
∂y1
IE(η|y1, q1) =
·
σ2η
σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q
¸
σ2q
The last equality follows from well-known formulas for conditional expectations (see
DeGroot (1970) and appendix A). To consider the implicit incentive, suppose the agent
contemplates an (out-of-equilibrium) eﬀort variation de1 in period 1. He can then expect
that the inside principal will adjust her estimate of the agent’s ability by R0yde1. This
higher ability implies that the value of the outside contract for the agent increases by
dwO2 = β
O
2 R
0
yde1. The inside principal must match this oﬀer by increasing the agent’s
fixed (non-performance based) period 2 payment. On the other hand, the increased
11See e.g. Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
12At the beginning of the third period, both q1 and q2 are known.
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ability translates into an increased performance payment β∗2R
0
yde1 if the agent continues
to work for the inside principal, and the latter therefore only needs to adjust the non-
performance based salary by the diﬀerence (βO2 − β∗2)R0yde1. Since βO2 = γβ∗2, it follows
that the agent is faced with implicit first-period incentives on the y−task, and that
these are given precisely by βi1y. Of course, the salary adjustments that give rise to
these incentives are possible only because the parties are not bound by a long-term
non-renegotiable contract.
Next we will argue that period-2 contract adjustments induce implicit first-period
incentives on the q-task given by
βi1q = (γ − 1)β∗2R0q + (1− γβ∗2)r0q, where
R0q =
∂
∂q1
IE(η|y1, q1) =
·
σ2η
σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q
¸
σ2y, r
0
q =
∂
∂q1
IE(η|q1) =
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
q
Again, the formulas involving conditional expectations are well known. To derive the
implicit incentive, suppose the agent contemplates an eﬀort variation da1 in period 1. He
can then expect that an outside principal, who observes only q1, will adjust her estimate
of the agent’s ability by r0qda1, and on that basis will adjust her estimate of expected
profits by dπ = (1 − β02)r0qda1. Competition implies that the agent’s outside oﬀer will
increase by this amount.
The inside principal, who observes both y1 and q1, updates her estimate of the agent’s
ability byR0qda1, and consequently adjusts her estimate of the value of an outside contract
for the agent by dwO2 = dπ + β
O
2 R
0
qda1. She must match this higher oﬀer, but since
the higher ability will increase the agent’s inside performance payment by β∗2R
0
qda1,
it is suﬃcient for the inside principal to adjust the non-performance based part by
dwO2 − β∗2R0qda1. Substituting for dwO2 and for βO2 = γβ∗2, we see that this adjustment
equals βi1qda1. Hence we have shown that contract adjustments in period 2 generate
implicit first-period incentives on the q−task amounting to βi1q.
Note that, the more noise there is in the y−signal (the larger is σ2y), the more weight
is put on q relative to y in estimating the agent’s ability. If σ2y = 0 (∞), the principal
puts all (no) weight on the y−signal in estimating the ability. Similar considerations
apply to σ2q. Finally we note that if σ
2
y > σ
2
q , (σ
2
y < σ
2
q) the relative weight the inside
principal puts on the q−signal (y−signal) increases (decreases) when σ2η increases.
As we have seen, the fact that second-period compensation contracts depend on first-
period signals, q1 and y1, induces implicit incentives that aﬀect the agent’s first-period
eﬀective (i.e. explicit plus implicit) incentives. These distortive eﬀects can take the form
of either career eﬀects (which increase first-period eﬀective incentives) or ratchet eﬀects
(which decrease first-period eﬀective incentives). Consider first the y−task.
Proposition 3. When γ < 1 there is a ratchet eﬀect associated with the y−signal.
When γ > 1 there is a career eﬀect associated with the y−signal. For γ = 1, the inside
and outside principals oﬀer the same wage contract in period two, and there is neither a
ratchet nor a career eﬀect associated with the y−signal.
9
Recall that γ is the marginal rate of substitution between a−eﬀort and e−eﬀort in
the agent’s cost function if he works for an outside principal. In the case γ < 1, the
lower γ is, the more the agent is punished for high expectations about second-period
performance on y. The intuition is that when γ is low (γ < 1) outside principals oﬀer
low-powered incentives on the verifiable task (i.e. βO2 < β
∗
2). They do so because it is in
this case relatively inexpensive for the agent to provide eﬀort on that task. As a result,
agents with high ability have less to gain by working for these principals. The inside
principal’s response is to lower the fixed part of the second-period salary. This is the
ratchet eﬀect on the y−signal.
In the case γ > 1 the agent is rewarded for high expectations by the inside principal
about second-period performance on y. The intuition is that when γ > 1 ‘good’ agents
would like to work for outside principals (since they oﬀer a high bonus). The inside
principal cannot give such high-powered incentives (since she prefer balanced incentives),
and responds by oﬀering a higher fixed (non-performance based) salary component. I.e.
there is a career eﬀect associated with the signal y1 when γ > 1.
Finally, when γ = 1, inside and outside principals give the same explicit incentive
β∗2. As a result, the inside principal must also give the same fixed salary component to
ensure that she oﬀers a wage contract with the same certainty equivalent as the market.
Thus there is neither a ratchet eﬀect nor a career eﬀect related to the y−signal in this
case.
Consider next the q−task. If the agent increases his eﬀort on q relative to the
inside principal’s conjecture by da1, his second-period salary changes by βi1qda1 = [(1−
γβ∗2)r
0
q − β∗2(1− γ)R0q]da1 T 0 depending on the values of γ. To further understand this
result first note that when γ becomes high enough outside principals will lower their fixed
salary component, αO2 , in response to dq1 > 0. More specifically this eﬀect occurs when
γ > 1
β∗2
> 1. It reflects the fact that outside principals oﬀer high powered incentives,
i.e. βO2 > β
∗
2, and then reduce the fixed part of the salary to break even (the zero
profit constraint). The inside principal cannot give such high powered incentives, and
her response is to increase the fixed salary component for these values of γ. Similar
considerations apply to ‘low’ values of γ, i.e. for γ < 1
β∗2
. As a result, a change in γ
has two opposite eﬀects on the fixed salary components oﬀered, and the total eﬀect is
determined by their relative size. Specifically we note that the change da1 has a positive
(negative) eﬀect on the second-period salary when γ ∈ [0,Γ) (Γ,∞), for some Γ > 1
given β∗2 > 0.
13 To sum up.
Proposition 4. When γ < Γ := 1+R
0
yr
0
q
R0yr0q
there is a career eﬀect associated with the
q−signal. When γ > Γ there is a ratchet eﬀect associated with the q−signal.
To analyze the total eﬀect of changes in γ on first-period incentives, which in turn
will determine the agent’s choices of eﬀort, we finally turn to period 1.
13Note that (1− γβ∗2)r0q = β∗2[1− (γ− 1)r0q], and that r0q −R0q = R0yr0q > 0. In appendix A we give the
exact expression for Γ.
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Period 1: Working for the inside principal, the agent chooses eﬀort according to
max
e1,a1
[α1 + β1y1 − C(e1, a1) + w2(e1, a1) + w3(a1) + const],
where wt(·) is the expected payment in period t > 1, given eﬀorts in period 1. As
we have seen, ∂wt
∂e1
= βi1y and
∂wt
∂a1
= βi1q, and these represent the implicit first-period
incentives generated by period-2 contracts. Moreover, eﬀort on the q−task will also
have implications for contracts in period 3, and we have ∂w3
∂a1
= ∂w3
∂q1
= ∂w3
∂q2
= β∗2. The
first-order conditions for eﬀorts in period 1 are thus
e1 :
∂C1
∂e1
= β1 + β
i
1y = β1 + β
∗
2(γ − 1)R0y
a1 :
∂C1
∂a1
= βi1q + β
∗
2 = β
∗
2(γ − 1)R0q − (γβ∗2 − 1)r0q + β∗2
Since eﬀorts on the two tasks are perfect substitutes in the agent’s cost function, and
principals have a preference for eﬀort being split among the tasks, the optimal first-period
bonus (on the verifiable y−task) is given by
β∗1 = β
i
1q − βi1y + β∗2 = β∗2
£
2− (γ − 1)(R0y − (R0q − r0q))
¤
.
where the last equality follows from β∗2 =
σ2η
2σ2η+σ
2
q
and the expressions for βi1q and β
i
1y.
We first note that if γ = 1, optimal first-period incentives are twice as high as second-
period incentives. This is the case of a pure career eﬀect. The last part of the expression
for β∗1 reflects the eﬀect of the additional information the inside principal has access to
(through the y−signal). Since R0y − (R0q − r0q) > 0 (see appendix A), it follows that this
extra information leads the inside principal to further increase incentives if γ < 1. In
this case outside principals oﬀer low powered incentives, and agents with high ability
are less eager to work for these principals. There is then a ratchet eﬀect associated with
the y−signal, and the inside principal’s optimal response is to raise first-period explicit
incentives.
From the formula we see that the relationship between first- and second-period ex-
plicit incentives β∗1 and β
∗
2 depends on the relative magnitudes of the implicit incentives
βi1y and β
i
1q. The latter are illustrated in Figure 1. They are equal for some γ¯ in
(1,Γ)–the exact value is γ = 1 + 1
R0y−(R0q−r0q) , see appendix A.
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Figure 1: Implicit incentives
For γ = γ¯ we thus have β∗1 = β
∗
2, i.e. explicit incentives in periods 1 and 2 are then equal.
In this case there are career eﬀects (induced by period-2 contracts) on both tasks, but
since they are of equal magnitude, explicit first-period incentives on the y−task need
only match the career incentive (β∗2) on the q−task stemming from period-3 contract
adjustments. For γ < γ¯ the implicit incentive βi1y on the y−task is weaker than that
(βi1q) on the q−task (for γ < 1 the former is in fact negative), and the principal must
compensate by increasing the explicit incentive β∗1. In this region career incentives (on
the non-verifiable q−task) and explicit incentives (on the y−task) are complementary
in the sense that higher career incentives imply higher explicit incentives. For γ > γ¯
the career eﬀect on the y−task dominates, and it suﬃces for the principal to provide
lower explicit incentives on that task. Explicit first-period incentives are thus lower
than explicit second-period incentives (β∗1 < β
∗
2) in this region. Since β
∗
3 = 0, we may
summarize this discussion regarding the time profile of explicit incentives in the following
result.
Proposition 5. For γ = 1 + 1
R0y−(R0q−r0q) > 1 we have:
i) Suppose γ ≤ γ, then β∗1 ≥ β∗2 ≥ β∗3 = 0, and explicit incentives from the optimal
compensation contract are strongest early in the agent’s career.
ii) Suppose γ > γ, and β∗2 > 0. Then 0 = β
∗
3 < β
∗
1 < β
∗
2, and explicit incentives from
the optimal compensation contract are non-monotone (inverse U-shaped) over the time
periods.
Remark 1. In contrast, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) obtain the opposite result: Ex-
plicit incentives should be strongest for agents close to retirement. In their model agents
only exert eﬀort on one task. Thus, explicit incentives and career concern incentives
are substitutes in the sense that higher career concerns incentives reduce the required
explicit incentives needed to induce a certain eﬀort level.
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3.2. Comparative Statics
We now analyze how optimal incentives and welfare vary with the diﬀerent parameters,
σ2η, σ
2
q, and σ
2
y. We will show that the presence of both ratchet eﬀects and career eﬀects
produce incentives that can be highly non-monotone in observable measures of uncer-
tainty. Consequently, the model oﬀers a possible explanation for the fact that empirical
studies observe both a positive and negative correlation between risk and incentives.14
We first analyze how optimal incentives vary with the uncertainty regarding ability,
σ2η. To better understand why first-period incentives might be non-monotone in this
variance, consider the following example. Suppose σ2q = 20, σ
2
y = 1, and γ = 1.9. Figure
2 shows a plot of optimal first-period incentives β∗1 = β
∗
1(σ
2
η) (thin line) and second-period
incentives β∗2 = β
∗
2(σ
2
η) (thick line) for this example.
15
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2
η1
)
First note that the larger the uncertainty about ability, the easier it is for the agent,
by increasing his eﬀort, to influence the principals’ estimate of his ability. This career
concern eﬀect increases second-period incentives, and ceteris paribus, first-period incen-
tives. Secondly, when σ2η increases, the relative weight the inside principal puts on the
y−signal increases too (since σ2q > σ2y here). The strength of the ratchet eﬀect is there-
fore increasing in σ2η (in this example). An increase in σ
2
η thus have two opposite eﬀects
on first-period incentives. When the former eﬀect dominates the latter, first-period in-
centives are increasing in σ2η and vice versa. More specifically we can prove the following
proposition, which shows that β∗1 is non-monotone in σ
2
η if and only if γ exceeds some
γˆ > 1.
Proposition 6. i) For γ < 1 + 1
4
µ
1 +
σ4y
σ2q(σ2q+2σ2y)
¶
= γˆ, ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2η
> 0 for all σ2η.
ii) For γ > γˆ, ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2η
R 0 for σ2η Q σ˜2η, for some σ˜2η > 0.
Proof. Appendix A. ¤
14Prendergast (2000a) gives an overview of the empirical literature on the tradeoﬀ of risk and incen-
tives. See also Prendergast (1999, 2000b).
15The exact expression is β∗1 =
σ2η
σ2η+10
3(σ2η)
2+260σ2η+800
21(σ2η)
2+440σ2η+400
.
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Next, we consider how the noise in the market signal, σ2q, aﬀects incentives.
If σ2q = 0, then the principal puts no weight on the y−signal. Since both the inside
principal and the market estimate the agent’s ability on the same information, period
t incentives are set to the level that equals the market’s reward for a better estimate
of the agent’s ability, i.e. β∗1 = 1 and β
∗
2 =
1
2
. On the other hand, if σ2q = +∞, then
β∗1 = β
∗
2 = 0 : The q−signal is uninformative, and thus there are no career concern
incentives. The principal’s response is to set explicit incentives to zero as well.
Again the derivative shows that first-period incentives can be non-monotone in σ2q.
We first illustrate this fact by an example. Let σ2η = 100, σ
2
y = 20, and γ =
1
2
. By
plotting first-period (thin line) and second-period (thick line) incentives we get :16
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Figure 3: β∗t (σ
2
q)
To understand this result, note that σ2q influences first-period incentives in two ways.
First, through the optimal second-period bonus β∗2, which is decreasing in σ
2
q. Secondly,
through the weight the principal puts on the q−signal relative to the y−signal. When
σ2q is low, the inside principal puts a relatively large weight on the market signal and
the ratchet eﬀect is weak. In addition, the eﬀect of σ2q on second-period incentives is
low for small values of σ2q. Optimal first-period incentives are increasing in σ
2
q for low
values of σ2q. On the other hand, when σ
2
q is large, the inside principal puts a relatively
large weight on the y−signal implying that the ratchet eﬀect is strong. Furthermore,
second-period incentives are low. Now, optimal first-period incentives are decreasing in
σ2q.
More formally we have the following proposition, which shows that β∗1 is non-monotone
in σ2q when γ is ‘small’ (and σ
2
y < 2σ
2
η, case (ii)), or when γ is ‘large’ (case (iii)b).
Proposition 7. i) For 0 ≤ 1− γ < σ2y
2σ2η
, ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2q
< 0 for all σ2q.
ii) For σ
2
y
2σ2η
< 1− γ, ∂β∗1
∂σ2q
R 0 for σ2q Q σˆ2q for some σˆ2q > 0.
iii) For γ > 1, (a) ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2q
< 0 for σ2q small and (b)
∂β∗1
∂σ2q
> 0 for σ2q large iﬀ γ > 3 + 2
σ2y
σ2η
Proof. Appendix A. ¤
16The exact expression is β∗1 =
25
200+σ2q
40000+33(σ2q)
2+3800σ2q
5000+3(σ2q)
2+350σ2q
.
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Finally, comparative static results on optimal incentives due to changes in σ2y, are
obtained.
First we note that second-period incentives are independent of σ2y. Secondly, while
first-period incentives are non-monotone in both σ2η and σ
2
q the following calculation
shows that β∗1 is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in σ
2
y if γ < (>) 1.
Proposition 8. ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2y
= β∗2(γ − 1) σ
2
ησ
2
q(2σ
2
η+σ
2
q)
(σ2ησ2q+σ2yσ2η+σ2yσ2q)
2 T 0, when γ T 1.
Proof. Appendix A. ¤
The intuition is that when γ > 1, there is a career eﬀect present on the y−signal (see
Proposition 3). Thus, if the agent increases his eﬀort on y relative to the inside principal’s
conjecture, his expected second-period salary increases, but at a decreasing rate as σ2y
increases. As a result, the agent’s career incentives decrease as the y−signal becomes
more noisy. The inside principal’s response is to raise first-period incentives. Similarly,
when γ < 1 there is a ratchet eﬀect on the y−signal, and the negative eﬀect on the
fixed salary part of increased eﬀort relative to the principal’s conjecture decreases, when
σ2y increases. The inside principal’s optimal response is, thus, to damped first-period
incentives.
After characterizing optimal incentives, we now study how expected welfare depends
on the strength of career concerns. The total certainty equivalent is
TCE =
3X
t=1
·
1
2
IE(yt + qt)− 1
2
(et + at)
2
¸
− r
2
var(w1 + w2 + w3).
In appendix C we show that
var(w1 + w2 + w3) = (β
∗
2)
2 V ; V :=
£
4σ2η (v + 1)
2 +
¡
v2 + 1
¢ ¡
σ2q + σ
2
y
¢¤
,
where v :=
£
2 + (1− γ)R0yr0q
¤
> 0, for γ < 2+R
0
yr
0
q
R0yr0q
. We also note that R0yr
0
q > 0 and that
∂R0yr0q
∂σ2η
> 0. Since et + at = β
∗
t , t = 1, 2, 3, the total certainty equivalent is
TCE = 3m0 +
1
2
P2
t=1 [β
∗
t (1− β∗t )]−
r
2
(β∗2)
2 V.
To evaluate how changes in career concerns aﬀect welfare note that the career eﬀect
is increasing in σ2η. Again let
∂β∗t
∂σ2η
:= β∗0t , t = 1, 2. We get
∂TCE
∂σ2η
=
1
2
P2
t=1 (β
∗0
t (1− 2β∗t ))−rβ∗2
µ
β∗02 V +
r
2
β∗2
·
4(v + 1)2
+v0
¡
8σ2η(v + 1) + 2v(σ
2
η + σ
2
y)
¢ ¸¶ ,
which may be positive or negative since β∗01 T 0, β∗02 > 0, and v0 := ∂v∂σ2η = (1−γ)
∂r0qR0y
∂σ2η
T 0.
To sum up.
Proposition 9. Expected welfare is non-monotone in the strength of career concerns.
15
The intuition is the same as in the two-period model: When career concerns are
low, (e.g., due to a low σ2η), the gain of more eﬀort outweighs the welfare loss due to
increased risk premium. When career concerns are strong, (e.g., because σ2η is high),
optimal explicit incentives are high. Thus, the agent bears much risk, and higher career
concerns reduce welfare.
When agents are risk-neutral, (r = 0), total welfare might again be decreasing in the
strength of the career eﬀect. This happens when the career eﬀects are so strong that the
agent’s cost of providing more eﬀort outweight the associated increase in the production
value.
We end this section by showing that expected welfare is non-monotone in γ > 0. I.e.
∂TCE
∂γ
=
∂β∗1
∂γ
(1− 2β∗1)−
r
2
(β∗2)
2∂V
∂γ
,
which may be positive or negative since ∂V
∂γ
:= −R0yr0q(8σ2η(v+1)+2v(σ2η+ σ2y)) < 0 and
∂β∗1
∂γ
< 0. To understand this result first note that first-best is achieved for β∗t =
1
2
, t > 0.
Second, the variance is decreasing in γ > 0 (since ∂β
∗
1
∂γ
< 0). Finally, β∗1 might be both to
high and to low relative to first-best. Suppose now that β∗1 is too high relative to first-
best, i.e. β∗1 > 0. In this case expected welfare is increasing in γ. This is due to the fact
that an increase in γ both reduces the risk faces by risk-averse agents, and brings first
period incentives closer to first-best. Next, suppose β∗1 <
1
2
such that an increase in γ
brings first-period incentives further away from the first-best incentives. Ceteris paribus
this decreases total expected welfare. The increase in γ still reduces the variance of the
first period salary. Thus the total eﬀect on welfare depends on the relative strength of
these two eﬀects. To sum up.
Proposition 10. Expected welfare is non-monotone in γ > 0. The more risk averse the
agent is, the more beneficial is an increase in γ, since it reduces the risk premium.
4. Related Literature
The fact that career concerns is a means to provide incentives for exerting eﬀort was first
discussed by Fama (1980) and Holmström (1982). Fama (1980) argued that incentives
contract are not necessary since agents are disciplined by career concerns, while Holm-
ström (1982) showed that career concerns incentives are not suﬃcient to induce eﬃcient
eﬀort. Building on this fact, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) added explicit contracts to the
Fama-Holmström model, and showed that an optimal compensation contract optimizes
the combination of explicit and implicit incentives. None of these models discuss implicit
incentives related to the ratchet eﬀect–see also Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999).
Meyer and Vickers (1997) raised this question and showed that the influence of ratchet
eﬀects are more fundamental than career concerns in the sense that maximized welfare is
decreasing in the strength of the former but unaﬀected by the latter. Roland and Sekkat
(2000) analyze how career concerns may induce managers in state-owned enterprises to
restructure their firms. Building on the model by Ickes and Samuelson (1987), they show
16
that competition for managers eliminates the ratchet eﬀect. All of these models assume
that agents only exert eﬀort on one single task.
Building on the work by Holmström and Milgrom (1991)–see also Itoh (1991, 1992,
1993)–Martimort (1993), Olsen and Torsvik (1993, 1995, 1998), and Meyer, Olsen, and
Torsvik (1996) analyze how ratchet eﬀects aﬀect optimal explicit incentives and welfare
in a multitask agency model. These models do however suppress career concerns and
focus exclusively on ratchet eﬀects.
5. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that some of the guidelines for the impact of career concern incentives
that emerge from a single task analysis can be overturned in models where agents do
several tasks. The key to understand this fact is to note that explicit incentives and
career concern incentives are complementary in the multitask models we propose. As a
result, higher career concern incentives (on one task) imply higher explicit incentives on
the other task. Thus, stronger career concerns impose more risk on agents, and might
lower maximized welfare.
Moreover, the interaction of implicit incentives in the form of both career concerns and
ratchet eﬀects produces non-standard comparative statics results with respect to explicit
incentives. In particular, it was shown that more prior uncertainty about the agent’s
ability, or more noise in the available performance measures may lead to either higher or
lower explicit incentives for the agent. The model thus oﬀers a possible explanation for
the fact that empirical studies observe both positive and negative correlations between
risk and incentives.
An important, but realistic, assumption in this paper is that the inside principal has
more information about the agent’s type than outside principals. We have chosen to
model this by assuming that the inside signal is suﬃciently verifiable such that it can be
contracted upon, but outside principals do not observe the signal. An alternative way
of expressing the idea that the inside principal has more information about the agent
is to follow Waldman (1984) and Ricard i Costa (1988) and assume that the current
employer learns the agent’s ability faster than prospective employers do. This resembles
our model in the case outside principals’ observation of the inside signal is so noisy that
they base their conjectures of the agent’s type solely on the market signal.
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Appendices
A. Technicalities
In this appendix we provide more details regarding some of the calculations in this paper.
A.1. var(w1 + w2)
We first show that var(w1 + w2) = β
∗2
1
£
σ2y + σ
2
q + 4σ
2
η
¤
. Note that β∗1 =
σ2η
σ2q+σ
2
η
. Thus,
var(w1 + w2) = var(β1y1 + w2(q1))
= var(β∗1(y1 + q1))
= (β∗1)
2[var(y1) + var(q1) + 2cov(y1, q1)].
The covariance-matrix (η, q1, q2) is
η q1 q2
η σ2η σ
2
η σ
2
η
q1 σ
2
η σ
2
q σ
2
η
q2 σ
2
η σ
2
η σ
2
q
.
Thus
var(w1 + w2) = β
∗2
1
£
σ2y + σ
2
q + 4σ
2
η
¤
.
A.2. The Expressions for R0y and R
0
q.
Note that the covariance matrix (y2, y1, q1) is
y2 y1 q1
y2 σ
2
η + σ
2
y σ
2
η σ
2
η
y1 σ
2
η σ
2
η + σ
2
y σ
2
η
q1 σ
2
η σ
2
η σ
2
η + σ
2
q
.
By inverting and applying well-known formulas (see e.g., DeGroot (1970)) we get
R0y : = −Ry =
·
σ2η
σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q
¸
σ2q , and
R0q : = −Rq =
·
σ2η
σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q
¸
σ2y.
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A.3. The Value of Γ.
By using the expressions for R0q, r
0
q, and β
∗
2 we get
(1− γ σ
2
η
2σ2η + σ
2
q
)
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
q
+
σ2η
2σ2η + σ
2
q
(γ − 1)
·
σ2η
σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q
¸
σ2y.
By setting this expression equal to zero and solve for γ we obtain
Γ :=
1
(σ2η)
2
2(σ2η)
2σ2q + (σ
2
η)
2σ2y + 2σ
2
ησ
2
yσ
2
q + (σ
2
q)
2σ2η + (σ
2
q)
2σ2y
σ2q
.
A.4. The Value of γ.
By using the expressions for R0y and R
0
q we get
β∗1 = β
∗
2
·
2σ2y[(σ
2
η)
2 + 2(σ2q)
2] + σ2ησ
2
q [(4− 2γ)σ2η + (3− γ)σ2q + 4σ2y]
σ2y[(σ
2
η)
2 + 2(σ2q)
2] + σ2ησ
2
q[σ
2
η + σ
2
q + 2σ
2
y]
¸
.
From this expression it follows easily that i) it decreases in γ, and ii) that the expression
is equal to one when
γ := γ =
(σ2η)
2 + 2(σ2q)
2 + 2σ2ησ
2
q
σ2ησ
2
q
¡
2σ2η + σ
2
q
¢ σ2y + 3σ2η + 2σ2q2σ2η + σ2q .
A.5. The Partial Derivative ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2η
. (Proof of Proposition 6).
Substituting for β∗2 and R
0
y, r
0
q in the expression for β
∗
1 we get
β∗1 = β
∗
2
£
2− (γ − 1)R0y(r0q − 1)
¤
=
2σ2η
2σ2η + σ
2
q
+ (1− γ) σ
2
ησ
2
q
σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q
(
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
q
)
=
2
2 +Q
+ (1− γ) nQ
nQ+ y + yQ
1
1 +Q
,
where Q = σ
2
q
σ2η
, n = σ2η, y = σ
2
y. Diﬀerentiation shows that
∂
∂Q
β∗1 > 0 iff f(Q) = 2
n+ y
n
µ
Q+
y
n+ y
¶2
(1 +Q)2
(2 +Q)2
−(1−γ)
µ
y
n+ y
−Q2
¶
< 0.
We see that f(0) < 0 iﬀ y
2n
< (1− γ) and f(∞) < 0 iﬀ 2(1 + y
n
) < −(1− γ). Moreover
f(Q) > 0 for Q = ( y
n+y
)
1
2 , for any γ. The proposition then follows by noting that f(Q)
is monotone increasing for γ ≤ 1.
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A.6. The Partial Derivative ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2q
. (Proof of Proposition 7).
We may write
β∗1 =
2N
2N + 1
+ (1− γ) N
N +NY + Y
(
N
N + 1
), where N =
σ2η
σ2q
, Y =
σ2y
σ2q
.
Diﬀerentiation shows that
∂
∂N
β∗1 > 0 iff g(N) =
2 (N + 1)2
(2N + 1)2
+ (1− γ)N N + 2NY + 2Y
(N +NY + Y )2
> 0.
We see that g(0) > 0 and that g(∞) > 0 iﬀ 1
4
(1+Y )2
1+2Y
> −(1 − γ). Moreover, we have
g(N) > 0 for γ ≤ 1, and g0(N) < 0 for γ > 1 (g0(N) has the same sign as −2 + (1 −
γ)Y 2 (2N+1)
3
(N+NY+Y )3
). The statements in the proposition follow from these observations.
A.7. The Partial Derivative ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2y
. (Proof of Proposition 8)
Note that ∂β
∗
1
∂σ2y
= β∗2(γ − 1)
∂(R0q−R0y)
∂σ2y
. We get
∂β∗1
∂σ2y
= β∗2(γ − 1)
σ2ησ
2
q(2σ
2
η + σ
2
q)
(σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q)
2
T 0, when γ S 1.
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B. The Wage Contracts in Period 2
Period 2: By using the fact that the agent has career incentives to exert eﬀort a2 in this
period, (to increase his market value), that the inside principal prefers balanced eﬀort,
and hence most provide balanced incentives, we have
β∗2 =
∂α3(q1, q2)
∂q2
=
σ2η
2σ2η + σ
2
q
.
Outside principals oﬀer a contract wO2 = α
O
2 +β
O
2 y2. To balance incentives on the two
tasks, the bonus oﬀered by an outside principal must satisfy βO2 = γβ
∗
2. This is so because
the marginal cost of the two activities satisfy ∂C
O
∂et
= γ(γet + at) = γ
∂CO
∂at
if the agent
works for an outside principal. Since there is competition between outside principals,
they earn zero expected profit. The expected wage payment from such a principal, had
she hired the agent, would be IE(w2 | q1) = αO2 +βO2 [IE(y2 | q1)]. Competition implies that
this must be equal to the expected benefit 1
2
[IE(y2 + q2 | q1)]. The zero profit condition
is then, αO2 + β
O
2 [IE(y2 | q1)] = IE [η + ba2 | q1] . Thus the contract oﬀered by an outside
principal in period 2 is
wO2 = (1− βO2 )[
σ2qm0 + σ
2
η(q1 − ba1)
σ2η + σ
2
q
+ ba2] + βO2 y2.
For the agent, this schedule has certainty equivalent CEO2 = α
O
2 + β
O
2 IE(y2 | q1, y1) −
1
2
(γe2 + a2)
2 − r
2
var(wO2 | q1, y1), where eﬀorts are given by (γe2 + a2) γ = γβ∗2 = βO2 .
The inside principal oﬀers w2 = α2 + β
∗
2y2, and conditions the contract on both
signals: q1, y1. To ensure that the agent continues to work for the inside principal, she
must oﬀer the agent at least as high reservation utility (or certainty equivalent) as the
market. I.e. CEO2 ≤ CEI2 = α2 + β∗2IE(y2 | q1, y1) − 12(e2 + a2)2 − r2var(w2 | q1, y1).
Hence, α2 = (1− γβ∗2)IE(y2 | q1) + (γ − 1)β∗2IE(y2 | q1, y1) + const, where the constant is
independent of q1, y1. (It represents eﬀort costs, risk premium etc.) The contract oﬀered
by the inside principal is thus
w2 = (1− γβ∗2)IE(y2 | q1) + β∗2 [y2 − (1− γ)IE(y2 | q1, y1)] + const.
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C. Welfare in the 3-Period Model
In this appendix we show that
var(w1 + w2 + w3) = (β
∗
2)
2 £4σ2η (v + 1)2 + ¡v2 + 1¢ ¡σ2q + σ2y¢¤ ,
where v :=
£
2 + (1− γ)R0yr0q
¤
. We have,
w1 = const+ β
∗
1y1,
w2 = const+ (1− γβ∗2)IE[y2 | q1] + β∗2 [y2 − (1− γ)IE[y2 | y1, q1]]
w3 =
σ2qm0 + σ
2
η
P2
t=1(qt − bat)
σ2q + 2σ
2
η
, where
IE[y2 | q1] = IEy2 + r0q(q1 − IEq1); r0q =
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
q
, and
IE[y2 | y1, q1] = IEy2 +R0q(q1 − IEq1) +R0y(y1 − IEy1).
Thus,
var(w1 + w2 + w3)
= var
©
β∗1y1 + (1− γβ∗2)r0qq1 + β∗2y2 + β∗2(γ − 1)[R0qq1 +R0yy1] + β∗2(q1 + q2)
ª
= var
©£
β∗1 + β
∗
2(γ − 1)R0y
¤
y1 + β
∗
2y2 +
£
β∗2(γ − 1)R0q + β∗2 + (1− γβ∗2)r0q
¤
q1 + β
∗
2q2
ª
.
Note that (γβ∗2 − 1)r0q = [(γ − 2)r0q − (1− r0q)]β∗2 such that
β∗1 + β
∗
2(γ − 1)R0y = β∗2(γ − 1)R0q + β∗2 + (1− γβ∗2)r0q = β∗2
£
2 + (1− γ)(r0q −R0q)
¤
.
Let
v :=
£
2 + (γ − 1)(R0q − r0q)
¤
=
£
2 + (1− γ)R0yr0q
¤
Then
var(w1+w2+w3) = (β
∗
2)
2
 v
2 [var(y1) + var(q1)] + var(y2) + var(q2)+
2
·
v [cov(y1, y2) + cov(y1, q2) + cov(q1, y2) + cov(q1, q2)]
+v2cov(y1, q1) + cov(y2, q2)
¸  .
The expressions for the variances and covariances are:
var(y1) = var(y2) = σ
2
η + σ
2
y,
var(q1) = var(q2) = σ
2
η + σ
2
q , and,
cov(y1, y2) = cov(y1, q1) = cov(y1, q2) = cov(y2, q1) = cov(y2, q2) = cov(q1, q2) = σ
2
η.
Thus
var(w1 + w2 + w3) = (β
∗
2)
2 £4σ2η (v + 1)2 + ¡v2 + 1¢ ¡σ2q + σ2y¢¤ .
We also note that
R0yr
0
q =
(σ2η)
2σ2q
(σ2η + σ
2
q)(σ
2
ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q)
> 0, and
∂r0qR
0
y
∂σ2η
=
σ2η
¡
σ2q
¢2
(2σ2y(σ
2
η + σ
2
q) + σ
2
ησ
2
q)
(σ2η + σ
2
q)
2(σ2ησ
2
q + σ
2
yσ
2
η + σ
2
yσ
2
q)
2
> 0.
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